Damir Artikov

 

                 Methodological Review of B.F.Skinner’s Conception of Operant Behavior

 

 

As it is frequently stressed by contemporary scholars’ (3), the experimental analysis of behavior began with a white rat. In B.F.Skinner’s research it was the object of his first experiment, begun in the 1930s, in which he discovered the role of the environment in the acquisition, maintenance, and modulation of behavior. Although rigorous experimental control of environmental-behavior relations was achieved first with rats and, later, with pigeons and other non-human animals, it was assumed from the beginning that the principles that emerged would apply to humans. The assumption of relevance led some researchers to interpret interesting cases of human behavior in terms of principles from the animal laboratory. It caused a sensitive pretext and increasingly sophisticated appreciation on the part of scientists. Others sought ways to extend and adapt the methods of animal research to the direct study of human behavior. The extension of the methods of analysis of animal behavior to that of humans posed substantial methodological and conceptual challenges.

The present article is focused in general on the methods used when the goal is to study basic processes of operant behavior. It would seem that the answers to the questions involving current methodological views of B.F.Skinner could be obtained from a reading of his works. Evidently, they could be obtained through historic-critical analysis, taking into consideration the content of the development of behavioral science. In the same way, we could explain his conservative attitude toward the new trends in behaviorism connected with the “rehabilitation” of “image” as a category. But it is absolutely another thing to discover the views concerning which there has been discord and even controversial opinions. In this regard we recognize that the researchers of B.F.Skinner’s conception and basic material obtained as the result of careful study of the conception have expressed their opinions based on a certain methodological basis derived from a careful study of the concept of operant behavior. But this means that in our attempt to find answers to the vexed questions stemming from the same basis we shall at best also receive one more justifiable point of view. Then we would be in a position to ask ourselves which point of view is to be preferred over all the others. Subsequently another question arises: how could it be generally possible to solve similar problems? What are the basic assumptions that would allow us to resolve these controversies?

We should point out two types of assumptions on the basis of which points of view are built, one is historical, the other ahistorical. In the first instance we find theoretical and methodological representations of the authors’ critical analysis. In the second we find representations of the authors’ historic-critical analysis of the development of psychological knowledge.

Thus, one fact thrusts itself upon us as indubitable: in the indisputable advantage of the historical approach to analysis of the conception of operant behavior. Let’s review some opinions from the ahistorical group:

 

“Skinner-Antiphysiologist”. P. Fress considers that B.F.Skinner takes an extreme antiphysiological position when he analyses the behavior. An appeal to physiology in explaining behavior means the transition to phenomena of another origin since physiological processes cannot be the reason for behavior (5, p. 72). L. I. Antsiferova considers antiphysiologism as a characteristic feature of behaviorism and neobehaviorism. Here “antiphysiologism” can be understood as the “most utterly negative attitude towards the attempts to compare the laws of a behavior with some facts concerning the activity of the brain (7, p. 237). M.G. Yaroshevsky has interpreted Skinner’s antiphysiologism in very nearly the same way. He considers it as the psychologist’s objection to physiology (6, p. 205). In the same way Watson said that there has been an attempt “to hide the soul in the brains.” Skinner has referred to drawing “ a physiological homunculus” in order to explain the ultimate reasons for human behavior (2, p. 166). Skinner wrote that this variety of the physiological homunculus, postulated as the controlling power, has an evident resemblance to the mental and spiritual homunculi of the old systems (7, p. 236).

L.I. Antsiferova explains that the antiphysiologism of B.F. Skinner defended determinism in psychology, asserted that the ultimate reason of behavior is the outside influence of the environment (1, p. 237).

 

“Skinner - operationalist”. According to P.Fress, Skinner “takes a strictly operationalist position” (5, p. 77). I. Kolobova characterizes Skinner as “analogical” (4, p. 146). In contrast to this unconditional hard line, the appreciation of Skinner by the Russian historians L.I.Antiferova and M.G.Yarososhevsky appears more positive. First of all, they both indicate that Skinner’s attitude to operationalism over time underwent essential changes. “Operationalism promised to put an end to subjectivism and to add to these notions the inherent rigor of science. Some well-known American psychologists became supporters of operationalism: Tolman, Magdijesh, Skinner, Stivence and others” (8, p. 378). Yaroshevsky points out that in Skinner’s article, published in 1931 (9) “for the first time the conditional reflex was interpreted not as the act of a real organism, but as derived from an experimental operation” (6, 197-198).

L.I.Antsiferova also notes that “Skinner’s first works appeared as realizations of a plan which could give operational definitions to the central notions of the behavioral theory.” She considers that Skinner has never been “a passionate supporter of operationalism”. For instance, according to Skinner, the notions of conditional reflex, requirements, confirmations, reinforcement may have significance only when they are defined either in terms of experimental operation or in the process of observation (2, p. 74). As A.V.Petrovsky has said, Skinner burned the notion of requirement into the operation of measuring tie after previous reinforcement.

However, later, Skinner viewed with markedly less enthusiasm his own operational plan to transform psychology into a strict science (8, p. 384).

In the 1940s Skinner came to the conclusion that operationally represented notions of stimulus and reactions were indiscernible. Later, while engaged in psycho linguistic analysis, he began to use non-operationalistic notions and finally rejected Bridgeman’s main idea that the “notion was a synonym for operation” (2, 108-109, 245-246).

But, as Yaroshevky justly noted, “the stamp of operationalism has left its mark on all his subsequent works” (6, p. 198). For example, while deducing with Blancksard the question about the nature of the recollectional image or notions, Skinner wrote: “When I recollect what something looks like, I may be just calling to my mind how I have looked at it.” So, it would seem at first that  he rejected operationalism. But he still remained an operationalist. Based on the foregoing we come to the conclusion that Skinner’s attitude toward operationalism is not clear.

“Skinner - antitheoretical positivist. P. Fress writes that “Skinner is a positivist. The psychologist ought to describe rather than to explain. He examines phenonemena, watches how they precede and follow, analyses the functional attitudes among them” (5, p. 77).

This is one of the main arguments “against theory”, explaining Skinner’s position, was an appeal to practical tasks. Skinner thinks that psychology is built for solving these problems. For Skinner, these tasks were outlined with the help of the idea of management. From Skinner’s point of view management of behavior requires functional relations, which have been determined directly, between earlier experimentally controlled stimuli and the subsequent reactions (1, p. 198, 390).

 

After summing up the facts of Skinner’s “antitheoretical” position we would like to focus attention on the question of his real attitude to theories of psychology and about his understanding of theory. This theory is not so clear for us.

Actually, on the one hand, according to the above-mentioned sources, we see that Skinner’s understanding of theory and his attitude toward psychological theories are determined by his attitude toward “operationalism” and toward physiological mechanisms. On the other hand we see from the following points that these attitudes evolved over a long period of time. Therefore, Skinner’s attitude toward theory had to evolve as well. Instead of this we see that he says that he supports theoretical discourse but in his own way.

Even the facts themselves, to which authors have pointed, verify that these opinions do not coincide with reality. Therefore, the first definition of the required foundations is that they must be historical.

But this is not enough. We can see that some contrary opinion toward Skinner’s priority have a historical foundation. Authors of varying persuasions utilize chronological data. Furthermore they also use various arguments of a subject-logical character.

This implies that our point of view should be not simply historical, but historical, possessing those features, which give it the privileged position of judgement.

We began with the particular purpose of answering vague questions relating to B.F.Skinner’s psychological conception.  We have come to the conclusion that the answer to these questions can be provided by the result of historic-theoretical analysis.

As such analysis of this conception, as far as we know, has not yet been conducted, we consider it a problem, which needs to be resolved. In order to resolve these problems special means have to be constructed and employed. We intend to address the problem of such means and methods in subsequent studies.

1. Antsiferova L.I. “Materialisticheskaia mysl v psikhologii kapitalisticheskikh stran.” V sb.:                    Sovremennaia psikhologiia v kapitalisticheskikh stranakh. M., 1963.

2. Antsiferova L.I. Materialisticheskie idei v zarubezhnoi psikhologii. M., 1974.

3. Handbook of Research Methods in Human Operant Behavior. Applied Clinical Psychology,              eds. Kennon A Lattal, Michael Perone. New York: Plenum Press, 1998.

4. Kolobova I. “Operatsionalizm.” Filosofskaia entsiklopediia. Vol 4. M., 1967, p. 146.

5. Fress P. “Razvitie eksperimentalnoi psikhologii” v sb.: Eksperimental’naia psikhologiia.                      Vypusk I. M. 1966.

6. Yaroshevsky M.G. Psikhologiia XX stoletiia. M., 1974.

7. Yaroshevsky M.G. Razvitie i sovremennoe sostoianie zarubezhnoi psikhologii. M., 1974.

8. Yaroshevsky M.G. Istoriia psikhologii. M., 1976.

9. Skinner B.F. “The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of Behavior.” Journal of General                          Psychology.  Number 5, 1931, pp 427-458.